Two Cases. Two Standards. One Constitution. Where Is Equal Justice?

By Jameel Aahmed Milansaar

Justice is not tested when the law is applied to those we disagree with. It is tested when the same law is applied equally to everyone, regardless of religion, identity, political affiliation, or public sentiment. The Constitution does not recognise Hindu justice, Muslim justice, or majority justice. It recognises only justice under law. The moment the application of law begins to differ according to the identity of the accused, the credibility of the justice system itself comes under scrutiny.

The two incidents involving the alleged consumption of non-vegetarian food on the waters of the Ganga have once again ignited this uncomfortable debate. The allegations in both cases touched upon the religious sentiments associated with one of India's most sacred rivers. Both incidents provoked public outrage. Both involved Indian citizens. Yet, the legal trajectory of each case appears strikingly different.

According to the details widely circulated, fourteen Muslim youths were arrested following a complaint alleging that they consumed non-vegetarian food on a boat and discarded leftovers into the Ganga. Multiple stringent penal provisions were reportedly invoked, including sections relating to offences affecting religious sentiments, public nuisance and environmental concerns. Bail was denied more than once, and the accused remained in judicial custody for over two months before eventually securing release.

In contrast, another case involving five Hindu youths allegedly showed them cooking chicken on a boat in the Ganga while also consuming alcohol. Police reportedly took suo motu cognisance after the video became public, registered a case and arrested the accused. However, comparatively less serious provisions were invoked, and the accused were granted bail the very next day.

Whether every allegation in either case is ultimately proved or disproved is a matter for judicial determination. Every accused person enjoys the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. But the question before the public is not about guilt; it is about consistency. When allegations are substantially similar and concern the same public sensitivities, why do the legal responses appear so different?

The principle of equality before law, guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, is not merely a constitutional ornament. It is the foundation of democratic legitimacy. Equality before law does not demand identical outcomes in every case; facts, evidence and legal circumstances can legitimately differ. However, where the differences in investigation, charges invoked, arrest procedures or bail outcomes appear to correlate more with identity than with objective legal distinctions, questions naturally arise.

Selective severity weakens public confidence far more than any individual verdict. When one community perceives that the law pursues it with exceptional rigour while another appears to receive procedural leniency under similar circumstances, faith in institutional neutrality begins to erode. Justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done.

The issue extends beyond these two incidents. Across recent years, public discourse has increasingly reflected concerns that identical acts often receive unequal treatment depending upon who the accused is, who complains, and how the political narrative unfolds. Such perceptions—whether ultimately justified or not—carry profound consequences. A legal system survives not merely on statutes but on public trust.

Equally important, hurting the religious sentiments associated with the Ganga cannot become acceptable merely because the accused belong to one community or another. If disrespect towards a sacred river constitutes an offence deserving legal action, then the standard must remain uniform. Neither religious identity nor political convenience should determine the intensity of prosecution. Constitutional morality demands one standard, not competing standards.

India's Constitution did not promise equal justice only in theory. It promised equal protection of the laws to every citizen. That promise loses meaning if equality exists only in the text of the Constitution while discretion produces unequal consequences in practice.

The real question, therefore, is not whether the accused were Hindu or Muslim. It is whether the institutions entrusted with administering justice acted with the same constitutional yardstick in both cases. If there were genuine legal distinctions, they deserve transparent explanation. If there were none, then the disparity deserves equally serious scrutiny.

Because the law cannot wear different faces for different citizens.

If the offence is the same, should the law not respond with the same seriousness?

If the Constitution is one, why should justice appear divided?

Two Cases. Two Standards. One Constitution.

The question remains: Where is Equal Justice?